Comparing Inequality Aversion across Countries When Labor Supply Responses Differ by Bargain, Olivier et al.
Comparing Inequality Aversion across Countries When
Labor Supply Responses Differ
Olivier Bargain, Mathias Dolls, Dirk Neumann, Andreas Peichl, Sebastian
Siegloch
To cite this version:
Olivier Bargain, Mathias Dolls, Dirk Neumann, Andreas Peichl, Sebastian Siegloch. Comparing
Inequality Aversion across Countries When Labor Supply Responses Differ. 2013. <halshs-
00805751>
HAL Id: halshs-00805751
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00805751
Submitted on 28 Mar 2013
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Working Papers / Documents de travail
WP 2013 - Nr 23
Comparing Inequality Aversion across Countries 
When Labor Supply Responses Differ
 
 
Olivier Bargain
Mathias Dolls
Dirk Neumann
Andreas Peichl
Sebastian Siegloch
Comparing Inequality Aversion across Countries
When Labor Supply Responses Di¤er
Olivier Bargain, Mathias Dolls, Dirk Neumann,
Andreas Peichl, Sebastian Siegloch
Submitted in May 2012, accepted in March 2013,
forthcoming in International Tax and Public Finance
Abstract
We analyze to which extent social inequality aversion di¤ers across nations when control-
ling for actual country di¤erences in labor supply responses. Towards this aim, we estimate
labor supply elasticities at both extensive and intensive margins for 17 EU countries and
the US. Using the same data, inequality aversion is measured as the degree of redistribu-
tion implicit in current tax-benet systems, when these systems are deemed optimal. We
nd relatively small di¤erences in labor supply elasticities across countries. However, this
changes the cross-country ranking in inequality aversion compared to scenarios following the
standard approach of using uniform elasticities. Di¤erences in redistributive views are sig-
nicant between three groups of nations. Labor supply responses are systematically larger
at the extensive margin and often larger for the lowest earnings groups, exacerbating the
implicit Rawlsian views for countries with traditional social assistance programs. Given the
possibility that labor supply responsiveness was underestimated at the time these programs
were implemented, we show that such wrong perceptions would lead to less pronounced and
much more similar levels of inequality aversion.
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1 Introduction
The level of redistribution through taxes and transfers di¤ers greatly between countries. In
the empirical literature, standard characterizations of these di¤erences rely on the e¤ect of
tax-benet systems on inequality and poverty. However, most studies ignore labor supply be-
havior when evaluating the level of redistribution, thus ignoring important constraints faced
by governments when setting taxes. More comprehensive approaches, which account for the
equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ underlying tax-benet policy design, make use of plausibleelastici-
ties taken from the literature. For instance, Immervoll et al. (2007) compare the e¢ ciency costs
of redistribution across European countries by assuming reasonableuniform elasticities. The
fact that some countries are willing to accept larger e¢ ciency losses from redistribution reects
either highly redistributive views or redistributive tastes being equal larger labor supply re-
sponsiveness to taxation. Hence, to go one step further, it is necessary to estimate labor supply
elasticities on the same data used for optimal tax characterization. In this way, country di¤er-
ences in social preferences can be disentangled from di¤erences in individual consumption-leisure
preferences.
This present paper addresses this issue by analyzing the extent to which social inequality aversion
di¤ers across nations when controlling for actual di¤erences in labor supply responses. Using
a common empirical approach, we estimate labor supply elasticities at both the extensive and
intensive margin for 17 EU countries and the US. Applying the same estimation method and
model specication provides estimates that can be consistently compared across countries. We
focus on a homogenous group, namely childless single individuals, with individual responses
aggregated to obtain elasticities at income group levels consistent with the discrete optimal tax
model formulated by Saez (2002). As suggested by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012) in the case
of France, we invert Saezs optimal tax model to retrieve parameters for the degree of social
inequality aversion (implicitly) embodied in actual tax-benet systems. Importantly, given the
optimality of the observed systems and existing level of redistribution, social inequality aversion
must be higher when labor supply is more responsive, i.e. e¢ ciency losses from redistribution
are higher.
Our results are as follows. We nd relatively small di¤erences in labor supply elasticities across
countries. However, this changes the cross-country ranking in inequality aversion compared to
scenarios following the standard approach of using uniform elasticities. Di¤erences in redistrib-
utive views are signicant between three groups of nations.1 The revealed social inequality aver-
sion parameters range from utilitarian preferences in Southern Europe and the US to Rawlsian2
1That is, we obtain partial orderings. For instance, we can say that the French, Irish and UK systems are
signicantly more Rawlsian than the US system and less redistributive than the Swedish one. Yet we cannot
conclude that inequality aversion is higher in France than in the UK or Ireland.
2Note that like many, we improperly use the term "Rawlsian" throughout the paper. Maximizing utility of
the worst o¤ person in the society is not the original version of Rawls (1972) but a kind of welfarist version of
Rawls, as explained in Kanbur et al. (2006).
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views in Nordic and some Continental European countries. We nd that labor supply responses
are systematically larger at the extensive margin generalizing previous results for the US to a
large group of Western countries and often larger for the lowest earnings groups. This result
necessarily exacerbates the implicit Rawlsian views revealed for Continental European countries
with traditional social assistance programs. However, revealed redistributive tastes become less
pronounced and much more similar across countries if we impose zero labor supply responses
(for instance, reecting that policymakers may have ignored e¢ ciency constraints at the time
these welfare programs were implemented). This nding highlights the importance of accounting
for e¢ ciency constraints when assessing social inequality aversion.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briey reviews the related literature. Section
3 presents the optimal tax model and the inversion procedure. Section 4 describes the main
elements of the empirical implementation (data, tax-benet calculations and income concepts),
while Section 5 presents the labor supply estimations. Inequality aversion results are reported
and discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. Descriptive statistics and labor supply elas-
ticities are reported in an Appendix to this paper (Sections I and II). An additional Appendix
(AF) gathers additional material and robustness checks.
2 Related Literature
The increasing availability of representative household datasets has allowed bringing optimal tax
theory to the data (see the survey of Piketty and Saez, 2013). However, empirical applications
remain scarce and limited in policy relevance because two fundamental primitives of the model
are di¢ cult to obtain, in particular using consistent data, i.e. labor supply behavior and social
preferences. While most applications assume plausiblevalues for both of them (as discussed
below), we estimate these individual and social preference parameters from the same data.
First, in terms of labor supply elasticities, most optimal tax applications have drawn estimates
from the literature. However, the size of elasticities varies greatly across studies, even for
the same country, due to di¤erent empirical approaches, data sources, data selection and time
periods (see Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Bargain et al., 2012). Therefore, it is not clear
which estimates to retain for cross-country comparisons. In our case, it is important to capture
genuine di¤erences in labor supply preferences across countries in order to retrieve tax-benet
implicit social preferences. The present study suggests a harmonized approach that nets out
the main methodological di¤erences (estimation method, model specication, type of data).
Another important aspect is the distinction between intensive and extensive responses. The
crucial role of the extensive margin has been acknowledged in the optimal tax literature since
Diamond (1980). Our estimates on single individuals show the major role of the extensive
margin to be a consistent result across all countries, with the largest responses found in the
low income groups. This result necessarily impacts on normative analyses (see Eissa et al.,
2008). Precisely, as explained by Immervoll et al. (2007), the prevalence of large participation
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responses particularly a¤ects the debate on whether redistribution should be directed to the
workless poor (through traditional demogrant policies) or working poor (via in-work support).
Countries choosing traditional social assistance programs despite large participation responses
in low income groups must therefore have very high redistributive tastes.
Second, available studies typically choose reasonable levels of inequality aversion to characterize
optimal tax schedules. Inversely, a countrys redistributive preferences at a certain point in
time can be explicitly retrieved by inverting the underlying optimal tax model. This approach
was rst suggested in the context of optimal commodity taxation (Christiansen and Jansen,
1978, Stern, 1977, Ahmad and Stern, 1984, Decoster and Schokkaert, 1989, Madden, 1996) and
regulation of utilities (Ross, 1984). It has been extended to the Mirrleesincome tax problem
by Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012), who characterize the properties of the tax-revealed social
welfare function and provide an illustration on French data, making assumptions regarding
the level of labor supply elasticities. These elasticties are estimated on data for the UK and
Germany in Blundell et al. (2009), who retrieve the implicit social welfare functions for the
two countries, focusing on single mothers. The present study adopts the optimal tax inversion
approach to systematically compare redistributive tastes between European countries and the
US.3 In a similar vein, Gordon and Cullen (2011) recover the implicit degree of redistribution
between federal and state taxation in the US.
Our analysis follows the standard welfarist approach with the social planner maximizing a
weighted sum of (increasing transformations of) individual utilities. In this way, optimal tax
formulas can be expressed in terms of the social marginal welfare weights attached to each indi-
vidual (or income group), which measure the social value of an extra dollar of consumption to
each individual (group). This framework has recently been generalized by Saez and Stantcheva
(2012) in considering endogenous social marginal welfare weights. On the one hand, in a nor-
mative approach, these weights can be ex-ante specied to t some principle of justice. On the
other hand, in a positive approach, implicit welfare weights can be derived empirically, namely
by retrieving actual social preferences. Our tax-transfer revealed approach belongs to this second
stream of research, which also includes attempts to directly elicit social preferences.4
Further to a mere measure of social preferences, it is also necessary to understand the mechanisms
3The present paper di¤ers from its ancestor, Bargain and Spadaro (2008), and a follow-up available as Spadaro
(2008), in several ways. Importantly, the present study integrates optimal tax analysis with labor supply estima-
tion and we cover a much larger set of countries. Therefore, conclusions are simply di¤erent.
4Some studies elicit peoples attitude towards inequality using survey data (see e.g. Fong, 2001, Corneo and
Grüner, 2002, or Isaksson and Lindskog, 2009). Tax preferences obtained in surveys have also be compared with
actual tax schedules (Singhal, 2008). In behavioral economics, experiments are often used to assess preferences of
a group (see for instance Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). With the well-known leaky bucketexperiment, respondents
are able to transfer money from a rich individual to a poor one but incur a loss of money in the process, so
that the equity-e¢ ciency trade-o¤ is taken into account in measuring tastes for redistribution (see for instance
Amiel et al., 1999); in recent experiments, participants have voted for alternative tax structures (e.g. Ackert et
al., 2007). Finally, in the public economic literature, implicit value judgments may be drawn from inequality
measures, assuming a natural rate of subjective inequality (see Lambert et al., 2003, Duclos, 2000).
3
shaping them (cf. Piketty, 1995) and investigate the political economy channel through which
policies are designed and implemented. Real world tax-benet schedules result from historical
and political economy forces. Nonetheless, the ction of a social planner can be seen as a
proxy for a more complex political process. Probabilistic voting models suggest that particular
social welfare functions are maximized in political equilibrium (cf. Coughlin, 1992).5 Saez and
Stantcheva (2012) also show that the median voter optimal tax rate is a particular case of the
optimal (linear) tax rate where social welfare weights are concentrated at the median. This
claries the close connection between optimal tax theory and political economy. In the latter,
social welfare weights that result from the political process are used rather than being derived
from marginal utility of consumption as in the standard utilitarian tax theory. Nonetheless, the
structure of resulting tax formulas is the same. Finally, another way to approach the problem
is to take political economy forces as distortions in the optimal tax design (see Acemoglu et
al., 2010). However, accounting for political economy considerations is beyond the scope of the
present paper. Hence, as discussed in the next section, we assume the observed system to be
optimal while being agnostic about the underlying political process and using the most simplistic
political economy model: the ction of a social planner.
3 Optimal Tax Model and its Inversion
We adopt the discrete version of the optimal tax model by Saez (2002), assuming the population
to be partitioned into I +1 income groups comprising I groups of individuals who work, ranked
by increasing market income levels Yi (i = 1; :::; I), and a group i = 0 of non-workers. Disposable
income is dened as Ci = Yi   Ti, where Ti is the e¤ective tax paid by group i (it is e¤ective
given that it includes all taxes and social contributions minus all transfers). Non-workers receive
a negative tax, i.e. a positive transfer  T0, identical to C0 by denition and often referred to as
a demogrant policy (minimum income, social assistance, etc.). Proportion hi measures the share
of group i in the population. With this discretized setting, Saez derives the following formula
for the optimal tax rates:
Ti   Ti 1
Ci   Ci 1 =
1
ihi
IX
j=i
hj

1  gj   j Tj   T0
Cj   C0

for i = 1; :::; I; (1)
5 It would certainly be interesting to extend the present approach to some explicit political economy model (see
Castanheira et al., 2012, for a survey and empirical assessment), despite basic representations such as the median
voter hypothesis being of limited applicability (cf. Alesina and Giuliano, 2011). Many dimensions are involved
in the case of tax-benet policy design in the real world, including other institutions (e.g. labor market policies,
as noted above), various actors (workers, unions, lobbies), and the role of expert and international inuences (cf.
Banks et al., 2005), which are often not accounted for by theory. Furthermore, social choice models in presence
of endogenous labor supply are rare.
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with i and i the elasticities at extensive and intensive margins respectively, and gi the set
of marginal social welfare weights assigned by the government to groups i = 0; :::; I.6 The
elasticities are dened as:
i =
Ci   Ci 1
hi
@hi
@(Ci   Ci 1) ; (2)
i =
Ci   C0
hi
@hi
@(Ci   C0) : (3)
Responses are restricted to only occur from one group to the neighboring group, and vice versa.
Social preferences are summarized by the set of welfare weights gi. These weights can be in-
terpreted as the (per capita) marginal social welfare of transferring one euro to an individual
in group i, expressed in terms of public funds. The only assumption made on individual pref-
erences is that there is no income e¤ect, a traditional restriction in this literature, supported
by our empirical results as discussed below.7 When income e¤ects are ruled out, an additional
constraint emerges from Saezs model, normalizing welfare weights as follows:X
i
higi = 1: (4)
The inverse optimal tax problem is relatively straightforward. A system consisting of I equations
(1) and equation (4) can be inverted to retrieve the I+1 marginal social welfare weights gi given
appropriate values for (observed) income levels Yi, (simulated) net tax levels Ti and (estimated)
elasticities i; i. The complete demonstration of the inversion procedure is documented by
Bourguignon and Spadaro (2012).8 To summarize redistributive tastes in each country by a
single-valued index, we use the parameterization suggested by Saez (2002) to relate weights and
net incomes, i.e.:
gi = 1=(p  Ci) for all i = 0; :::; I: (5)
6Note that Ti Ti 1
Ci Ci 1 corresponds to
T 0i
1 T 0i
in the standard formulation of optimal tax rules, with T 0i =
Ti Ti 1
Yi Yi 1
the e¤ective marginal tax rate (EMTR) faced by group i.
7Utility functions are not directly specied in Saezs model. Yet, the weights gi comprise the derivative of
the implicit social welfare function (integrated over all the workers within group i) and the individualsmarginal
utility of income. Utility functions are, however, necessary for the estimation of elasticities. For this, we choose
a exible functional form (see section 4). The condition of zero income e¤ects is not imposed a priori, but rather
checked a posteriori. We nd small or insignicant e¤ects, therefore this assumption is acceptable as a rst
approximation (see Appendix II).
8Due to the inversion procedure above we do not need to calculate elasticities for group 0 there is no such
elasticity according to denitions in equations (2),(3). In fact, the denition of the extensive/intensive elasticity
for group 1 1 (= 1) can be interpreted as the decrease in h1 due to a move to group 0 by workers when C1 C0
decreases, or alternatively as the response by non-workers (a move to group 1) when C1   C0 increases. This
reverse response is entirely determined by normalization (4), i.e. simple algebra leads to:
C1   C0
h0
@h0
@(C1   C0) =  
h1g1
h0g0
1:
It does not mean that groups 0 and 1 are similar in terms of labor supply preferences, simply that only one Saez
elasticity (here 1) is required to capture inter-group moves for these two groups.
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In this expression, p denotes the marginal value of public funds and  is a scalar parameter
reecting the social aversion to inequality.9 The higher , the more pro-redistributive the social
preferences, from  = 0 (utilitarian preferences) to  = +1 (the Rawlsian maximin case). For
each country separately, we rst obtain the values of gi by the inversion of the optimal tax
model, then we estimate the log of expression (5) to recover the structural parameter .10
Note that both the behavioral elasticities i and &i and group sizes hi are endogenous to the
tax-benet system (as explained by Saez, 2002 and discussed in Bargain et al., 2012) or other
institutions a¤ecting labor supply behavior (such as child care arrangements). Hence, they de-
pend on the social planners redistributive views (represented here by the set of welfare weights
gi and summarized by the inequality aversion parameter ). This source of endogeneity can be
a serious problem for the standard optimal tax approach, i.e. when using observed data on pop-
ulation weights and estimated elasticities to derive the optimal tax-benet schedule. However,
it is, by construction, not an issue in the inversion approach: The key identifying assumption
for this procedure to work is that the social planner has optimally chosen policies such that
the resulting income distribution (taking into account behavioral responses) corresponds to the
planners redistributive preferences. This optimality assumption necessarily incorporates elas-
ticities and populations weights as well. Without the assumption, agents would respond to any
optimalpolicy set by the planner so that elasticities and group sizes would change. This would
invalidate equation (1), i.e., actual tax levels would be no longer optimal (given the new values
for elasticities and population weights), and the optimal tax rule should be applied again, gen-
erating further responses, etc. Therefore, it must be assumed that at least one xed point exists
in which the left and right-hand sides of equation (1) are consistent. This is only the case when
the observed system corresponds to the optimal one. Only under this assumption, we are able
to recover the underlying inequality aversion of the planner in the given optimal tax framework.
9Of course, there are di¤erent views on what social inequality aversion really is - as , e.g., discussed by
Lambert et al. (2003). We rely here on a parameter  capturing the concavity of the social welfare function, as
parameterized by Saez (2002, p. 1058).
10The present characterization could be based on alternative social objective functions. Kanbur and Tuomala
(2011) have recently claried the interrelationships between various types of social objectives, including some with
sharp discontinuity at the poverty line (charitable conservatism and poverty radicalism) and less angular versions
such as usual constant elasticity inequality aversion (as the measure  used here) and the slow, quick, slow
empirical property of the Gini weights. Notice, however, that it follows from the discrete form of the social welfare
function used in the Saez optimal tax model that we do not impose any restriction on the shape of the marginal
social welfare weights (and hence allow for any discontinuities, as those present in charitable conservatism, for
instance). We only impose a constant elasticity inequality aversion in equation (5), i.e. to derive a single-valued
approximation of redistributive tastes in each country for the purpose of international comparisons. It could be
interesting to replicate our analysis with non-welfarist objectives (e.g. Kanbur et al., 2006) or welfare measures
that preserve individual heterogeneity (see Fleurbaey, 2008).
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4 Empirical Implementation
We now present the data and tax-benet simulations used to calculate Yi and Ci as well as
the income group denition. We use datasets for the US, 14 members of the EU prior to May
1, 2004 (the so-called EU-15, except Luxembourg) and 3 new member states (NMS), namely
Estonia, Hungary and Poland. The di¤erent data sources fulll the basic requirements for our
exercise, i.e. they provide a representative sample of the population (and in particular the
income distribution), are comparable across countries (the denition of the key variables has
been harmonized), and contain the necessary information to estimate labor supply behavior.
The fundamental information required by the optimal tax model is the e¤ective tax Ti = Yi  
Ci for each income group i = 0; :::; I. Household gross income is aggregated to obtain Yi.
We simulate taxes, social contributions and benets in order to obtain household disposable
income, which can be aggregated at the group level to obtain Ci.11 Tax-benet simulations
are performed using two calculators: EUROMOD for EU countries and TAXSIM for the US.
EUROMOD is designed to simulate the redistributive systems of EU-15 countries and NMS.
This unique tool provides a complete picture of the redistributive and incentive potential of
European welfare regimes.12 The datasets associated to EUROMOD are presented in Tables
I.1 and I.2 (Appendix I).13 We cover the policy years 1998 and/or 2001 for EU-15 countries
and 2005 for NMS.14 TAXSIM (version v9) is the NBER calculator presented in Feenberg and
Coutts (1993), augmented here by simulations of social transfers. As in several contributions
(e.g, Eissa et al., 2008, or Eissa and Hoynes, 2011), we use it in combination with the IPUMS
version (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series) of the Current Population Survey (CPS) data.
We use the 2006 data, which contains information on 2005 incomes.
Our selection focuses on potential salary workers in the age range 18   64 (thus excluding
pensioners, students, farmers and the self-employed). We exclude all households where capital
income represents more than 25% of the total gross income, as their labor supply di¤ers from our
target group. Most importantly, as with Blundell et al. (2009) we must focus on a homogenous
demographic group, since aggregating across di¤erent household types within a social welfare
function poses fundamental di¢ culties in terms of household comparisons and implicit equiv-
alence scales. Furthermore, Saezs model is formulated for single individuals; deriving optimal
11Simulated disposable incomes are used in place of self-reported incomes for two reasons. First, they give a
better rending of the redistributive intention of the social planner. Indeed, actual (and self-reported) levels of
taxes or benets are a¤ected by non-intended behavior such as the low take-up rate of some benets. Second,
simulated incomes are also consistent with the need to simulate counterfactual disposable incomes for all options
of hours worked in order to estimate the labor supply model.
12An introduction to EUROMOD, a descriptive analysis of taxes and transfers in the EU countries and robust-
ness checks are provided by Sutherland (2001). EUROMOD has been used in several empirical studies, notably
in the comparison of European welfare regimes by Immervoll et al. (2007).
13Note that Appendices with roman numbers are directly attached to this document while Appendices starting
with capital letters are part of an independent document.
14Note that we make use of those policy years available in EUROMOD at the time of writing (1998, 2001 or
2005). For comparison, we use TAXSIM simulations for the year 2005.
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taxes for couple households with two potential earners is acknowledged as being much more
di¢ cult (see the survey of Piketty and Saez, 2013). For our analysis, we thus select single men
and single women without children.15 Remarkably, we show that international comparisons on
single individuals reect much of the di¤erences in overall redistribution across countries (see
Appendix E).
In order to ease cross-country comparisons, we partition the population of each country into
a small number of groups, I + 1 = 6. In our baseline, group 0 is composed of inactive indi-
viduals who report neither labor nor replacement income. Contributory benets are treated
as replacement income derived from a pure insurance mechanism; in particular, unemployment
benets are interpreted as delayed income. However, in the case of the UK, Ireland and Poland,
unemployment benets (UB) are paid according to at rates and have no strong link to past
contributions. Hence, for these three countries UB are treated as redistribution. Next, groups
i = 1; :::; 5 are simply calculated as income quintiles among workers. Descriptive statistics of
our selected sample are reported in Tables I.1I.2 of Appendix I.16
5 Labor Supply Estimation
5.1 Empirical Model
We estimate the behavioral elasticities from Saezs optimal tax model, i and i, using a ho-
mogenous estimation method. We rely on a common structural discrete-choice model as used
in well-known labor supply studies for Europe (e.g. Blundell et al., 2000, van Soest, 1995) or
the US (e.g. Hoynes, 1996), which enables us to calculate comparable elasticity measures for
all countries under study. Given that the structural labor supply model has become a standard
tool in the literature, we only present our main modeling assumptions (more information can be
found in the aforementioned studies as well as Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). For each country
separately (surpressing the country index in the following), we specify consumption-leisure pref-
erences using a quadratic utility function, i.e. the utility of household k choosing the discrete
choice j = 1; :::; J can be written as:
Ukj = Vkj(ckj ; hkj) + kj (6)
with Vkj(ckj ; hkj) = ckckj + ccc
2
kj + hkhkj + hh(hkj)
2 + chckjhkj   fkj (7)
with household consumption ckj and hours worked hkj . Coe¢ cients on consumption and hours
worked, ck and hk, vary linearly with several taste-shifters (gender, polynomial form of age,
15Blundell et al. (2009) focus instead on single mothers. In our case, samples of single parents in some
countries are too small for meaningful results. Focusing on one homogenous group at a time implicitly assumes
some separability in the social planners program, with a rst stage of redistribution between demographic groups
and a second stage with vertical redistribution within homogenous groups (see Bourguignon and Spadaro, 2012).
16Non-contributory social transfers and contributory UB are described in the Appendix (part D and E). Ap-
pendix F provides an extensive sensitivity analysis on the treatment of UB recipients.
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region) and a normally-distributed random term for unobserved heterogeneity. As in Blundell et
al. (2000), we introduce xed costs of work fkj , equal to zero if j = 1 (inactivity) and non-zero
for j > 1 (implictilcy accounting for di¤erences in demand side constraints). We do not impose
tangency conditions apart from increasing monotonicity in consumption, which is a minimum
requirement for meaningful interpretation and policy analysis. The deterministic utility Vkj is
complemented by i.i.d. error terms ij . Tax-benet simulations described in the previous section
are used to evaluate disposable income ckj = d(wkhkj ; mk) for each hour choice j, as a function
of labor income wkhkj and non-labor income mk. For wages wk, we rst calculate raw wages
from data information on hours and income, proceed with an Heckman-corrected estimation
and nally predict wages for all observations in order to reduce the problem of division bias (see
Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999).
A common issue with the estimation of structural models of labor supply concerns the
identication of behavioral parameters under the assumption of wage exogeneity. Accordingly,
unobserved characteristics (e.g. being a hard-working person) may in fact inuence both wages
and work preferences and thus potentially bias estimates obtained from cross-sectional wage
variation across individuals. Our detailed simulation of nonlinear tax-benet schedules provides
a parametric source of identication which is frequently used in the empirical labor supply
literature (e.g. Van Soest, 1995; Blundell et al., 2000). In addition, we benet from some time
variation (two years of data for 7 countries) and spatial variation in tax-benet rules within each
country (for instance state-level tax rules in the US, as exploited in Hoynes, 1996). The role of
these exogenous sources of variation is discussed and analyzed in Bargain et al. (2012).
5.2 Labor Supply Elasticities
The labor supply model is estimated using J = 7 choices ranging from 0 to 60 hours/week
with a step of 10 hours, which enables us to capture the country-specic variations in hours
worked. Estimation results are reported and discussed in Appendix A (cf. Tables A.1-A.4),
and goodness-of-t measures and robustness checks in Appendix B (Table B.1). After the
estimation of the labor supply model, we numerically simulate responses at the individual level
and aggregate them at the income group level to calculate the elasticities specic to Saezs
optimal tax model.17 These results are reported in Tables II.1II.2 (Appendix II).
For a more convenient comparison across countries, point estimates are shown in Figure 1 below
for the di¤erent income groups. The rst result is that responses at the extensive margin are
systematically larger than at the intensive margin (except for group 1, for which both margins
are identical by denition). This nding generalizes previous results for the US (e.g. Eissa and
Liebman, 1996), Germany and the UK (Blundell et al., 2009).
A second result is that responses are usually larger for the lowest income groups of workers
(groups 1 and 2). Despite this being expected for single individuals, there is currently very
17We calibrate uniform changes in disposable income at the individual level to obtain percent changes in income
gaps, as dened in (2) and (3). Total responses, measured as a change in the population shares in each income
group, are then obtained by aggregation to calculate i and i for i = 1; :::; I (see also Blundell et al., 2009).
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Figure 1: SaezElasticities at the Extensive/Intensive Margins
little evidence on this (see the discussion in Bargain et al., 2012). However, the implications are
important for welfare analysis (see Eissa et al., 2008) and the optimality of in-work transfers
versus demogrant transfers (see Immervoll et al., 2007).18
We also investigate international di¤erences, providing a visual comparison of extensive margin
elasticities across countries in the upper panel of Figure II.2, with mean elasticities for income
groups i  1 and condence intervals based on bootstrapped standard errors.19 Elasticities are
especially large in Southern Europe, Ireland and Belgium, and particularly small in Eastern
Europe, France and the Netherlands. However, it is important to notice that international
di¤erences are relatively small, with mean extensive margin elasticities mostly in a range :1  :3.
Nevertheless, we hereafter show that even such small variation a¤ects international comparisons
in revealed inequality aversion.
18 Interesting exceptions are France, Finland and Denmark, i.e. countries where social assistance programs
generated high e¤ective marginal tax rates for the lowest income levels in the years under study. Marginal
changes in income di¤erentials d(Ci   C0) used to calculate elasticities therefore have a small impact on labor
supply for them. As discussed in section 3, the fact that elasticities are endogenous to current tax-benet systems
is not an issue since these systems are deemed optimal in our characterization. That is, our characterization of
social inequality aversion for these three countries incorporates conscatory (implicit) taxation being imposed on
the working poor.
19Estimates are generally relatively precise, yet 95% condence bounds are as broad as :4  :8 for Italy or :2  :5
for Ireland. As shown below, this a¤ects the international comparability of tax-benet revealed social inequality
aversion.
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*Saez' extensive margin elasticities averaged over income groups i=1,… ,I (point estimates) and 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2: Extensive Margin Elasticities: Comparisons
We make two nal remarks. First, despite their specic denition, elasticities used in Saezs
model are highly correlated with standardwage-elasticities, i.e. intensive and extensive elas-
ticities calculated as hour and participation responses to a 1% increase in wage rates. This is
shown for the extensive margin in Figure II.2 (lower part). Second, as stated by Keane and
Rogerson (2012), labor supply elasticities are neither a single number nor a primitive feature of
preferences [... and] one important source of confusion in the literature is the idea that one can
estimate a labor supply elasticity in one context and import this elasticity into other contexts.
We have addressed this (Lucas) critique, rstly by using a fully structural labor supply model,
which is secondly integrated with the optimal tax framework. The labor supply model allows
disentangling the e¤ect of tax-benet systems from other components, most importantly prefer-
ences and demographic composition. The integration with the optimal tax framework ensures
that those elasticities are perfectly consistent with the actual framework used for the analysis,
namely the optimal tax model of Saez (2002). Bargain et al. (2012) decompose cross-country
di¤erences in elasticities to assess the relative contributions of tax-benet systems, preferences
and demographic composition. We present results for the specic sample under study in Appen-
dix C. The ndings convey that while tax-benet systems explain part of the di¤erences, there
are also genuine di¤erences in work preferences across countries.
6 Revealed Social Inequality Aversion
In this section, we estimate the revealed inequality aversion implict in the tax-benet systems
of the 17 European countries under study and the US. While some background information on
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international di¤erences in tax-benet policies are summarized in Tables D.1-D.3 in Appendix
D, it is clear that the most important redistributive elements for single individuals are transfers
and progressive taxes, with the latter of particular importance in countries where singles are not
eligible for any income support (for instance, the US or Hungary).
6.1 Baseline results
We start our analysis by considering the e¤ective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) and e¤ective
participation tax rates (EPTRs), which provide an indication of the redistributive and incentive
e¤ects of the di¤erent welfare regimes. Appendix E highlights a U-shaped distribution of EMTRs
across income groups for most countries in Nordic and Continental Europe, which is well in line
with the results of Immervoll et al. (2007). This pattern is due to progressive taxation at the
top and means-tested social benets at the bottom. Furthermore, the working poor (groups 1
and 2) have been rather excluded from redistribution for the years under consideration.20 In the
US and Southern Europe, the overall level of net taxation is usually lower and the distribution
of EMTRs generally atter. There are exceptions, notably fairly high levels of e¤ective taxation
in upper income groups in Poland, Hungary, Ireland and Italy, as well as more pronounced
progressivity in Greece and Portugal.
Next, we report and discuss the distribution of revealed marginal social welfare weights gi
underlying our measure of inequality aversion, as derived from inverting the optimal tax formula
(see Table 1). A necessary condition for the implicit social welfare function to be Paretian, i.e.
non-decreasing at all productivity levels, is that weights gi are positive at all income levels.
Our results show that this is broadly the case for all countries and income groups. Marginal
social welfare weights for group 0 are much larger than for the rest of the population in Nordic
and Continental Europe, Ireland and the UK, which target non-marginal transfers towards the
bottom of the distribution. As found by considering EMTR, the welfare weights pattern is much
atter in countries characterized by little redistribution through social transfers (Southern and
Eastern Europe, the US). However, for this group of countries smaller weights on top incomes
reect higher tax progressivity (Portugal and Greece), while uniformly low weights on non-poor
groups reect high tax levels (Italy). Weights on group 1 (and sometimes 2) are smallest in
countries with generous social assistance schemes, reecting distortions imposed on the working
poor as discussed in the EMTR analysis.
We estimate our main indicator of social inequality aversion, i.e. the single-value index of ,
according to equation (5) based on the dsitributions of marginal social welfare weights. Figure
20 International heterogeneity in the degree of redistribution is not a¤ected by the treatment of unemployment
benets (UB), i.e. whether they are counted as part of the redistribution function or market income (according to
a pure insurance mechanism). Countries that do not redistribute much among childless single individuals do not
redistribute much in general (see Figure E.2. in Appendix E). This suggests that redistribution among this group
is representative of overall international di¤erences in tastes for vertical equity, conrming that we can conduct
the analysis on single individuals.
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g0 g1 g2 g3 g4 g5
AT 7.3 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7
BE 4.3 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.3
DK 4.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
FI 1.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7
FR 2.9 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7
GE 4.7 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
GR 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8
IE 3.3 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.8
IT 2.5 1.6 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5
NL 4.3 0.2 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
PT 1.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 0.9
SP 2.8 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8
UK 2.3 0.2 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.9
SW 6.1 0.0 0.2 0.6 0.5 0.6
EE 1.4 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9
HU 2.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
PL 3.5 0.5 -0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6
US 1.6 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
Table 1: Marginal Social Welfare Weights gi
3 reports the tax-benet revealed inequality aversion obtained under di¤erent elasticity scenar-
ios.21 The left panel shows inequality aversion when assuming that labor supply responses are
uniform across countries in fact, this is how inequality aversion has been analyzed in the liter-
ature to date. We apply the mean extensive margin elasticity over all countries to each country.
First, we nd that inequality aversion is in line with general perceptions, reecting utilitarian
preferences in Southern Europe and the US up to large levels close to Rawlsian views in Nordic
and some Continental European countries. Values are actually very close to those used for cal-
ibration in previous empirical applications: Saez (2002) states that  values around :25 (resp.
1) imply a reasonably low (resp. high) taste for redistribution, while a value of 4 is high enough
to proxy the Rawlsian benchmark. Our estimated parameters span this range, from around :25
(US, Spain, Italy) or below (Greece) to above 1 in Nordic countries, France and Belgium, up
to 3 in Denmark. Second, instead of the uniform mean elasticity estimated from our data, we
apply the uniform elasticities used in Immervoll et al. (2007), i.e. from :4 in group 1 to 0 in
group 5 with step :1. It turns out that the elasticities used in Immervoll et al. (2007) provide a
good benchmark, as the distribution of inequality aversion parameters is hardly a¤ected.
21We focus on the extensive margin because results for the key groups 0 and 1 depend less crucially on the
intensive margin (cf. Saez, 2002). Note also that we take the mean inequality aversion over the two periods when
two years of data are available, in order not to overload the graphs.
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Figure 3: Tax-benet Revealed Social Inequality Aversion 
The central contribution of this paper is to assess inequality aversion when labor supply re-
sponses di¤er across countries. Thus, in the middle graph of Figure 3, we confront the uniform
mean elasticityscenario with our baseline, i.e. inequality aversion parameters obtained under
country-specic elasticity estimates. Some reranking occurs for the 18 countries under study.
Countries with below-average elasticities automatically appear less Rawlsian than when using
mean elasticities, because the e¢ ciency constraint is not as tight. Considering France, for in-
stance, we nd very low labor supply elasticities. Assigning France a mean elasticity would thus
imply overestimating the e¢ ciency constraints and consequently overestimating the inequality
aversion. Conversely, large elasticities in Ireland push up the level of true inequality aversion.
We can cluster countries according to three broad groups. First, for Continental Europe, the
UK, Ireland and Finland we nd a  value around 1. Importantly, the large weight on group
0 (workless poor) drives the result of high inequality aversion for these countries, and is ratio-
nalized by the fact that the extensive margin dominates. As discussed above, if participation
responses were small, traditional social assistance programs could be in place without e¢ ciency
costs. However, as the extensive margin is large, the policy choice in these countries must be
interpreted by very high redistributive views. Second, our results for Southern/Eastern Europe
and the US suggest rather low levels of inequality aversion (smaller than 1), reecting a low
weight on group 0 while the weight on group 1 (working poor) is higher on average. Last, Scan-
dinavian countries and Belgium reveal inequality aversion parameters far above 1, which reects
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an even higher weight on group 0 than observed for the rst group of countries (see Table 1).
Finally, we provide 95% condence bands for the inequality aversion parameter, accounting for
the standard errors of the estimated participation elasticities (see the right panel of Figure 3).
Some comparisons are unambiguous (e.g. redistributive views in Sweden are more Rawlsian
than in the US). However, di¤erences are not signicant for all pairs of countries, i.e. the or-
dering of countriesredistributive tastes is incomplete (for instance, di¤erences between Sweden
and Denmark). However, reassuringly, we can distinguish the same three groups of countries as
delineated above.
6.2 Sensitivity Analyses
Our baseline results characterize the redistributive preferences embodied in actual tax-benet
systems given estimated elasticities and reasonable income group denitions. Despite it being
plausible to assume that observed tax-benet systems are optimal for the governments who
implemented them, they may have actually had completely di¤erent priors about these two key
parameters of the model.
Elasticities. We rst discuss what would happen if we use wronglabor supply elastici-
ties. In fact, it is possible that potential labor supply responses were underestimated or ignored
by policymakers in continental Europe when generous demogrant policies were designed and
implemented. It was only in the late 1990s that numerous policy reports released in Europe
highlighted the possibility that safety nets designed to prevent extreme poverty caused work
disincentives and inactivity traps. The same concern that welfare programs had pushed part
of the population into a state of welfare dependency had previously led to the 1996 welfare
reform in the US (see Piketty and Saez, 2013).22
Therefore, we suggest a polar case where extensive margin responses are set to zero, i.e. sim-
ulating the case that politicians completely ignored behavioral responses. The left panel of
Figure 4 shows that the international ranking is broadly preserved. However, absolute inequal-
ity aversion mechanically decreases: preferences are less Rawlsian if participation responses, i.e.
mobility between the workless poor and the working poor, are ignored. Consequently, most of
the di¤erences between countries vanish. However, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, and to some
22 In the context of the US and the UK, Piketty and Saez (2013) argue that governments retargeted transfers
from groups unable to work to beneciaries who were potentially able to work. This trend has led to a shift from
traditional means-tested social assistance programs toward in-work benets. This policy adjustment to the moral
hazard problem attached to traditional demogrant policies can be seen as a revision of beliefs about labor supply
responses and/or a change in social preferences (social welfare weights on non-workers fall relative to those on low
income workers, as society believes that a majority of the former can actually work). It is probably impossible
to di¤erentiate between these two aspects (i.e. it is equivalent to say that the society reassesses labor supply
responses upwards or increasingly favors desert-sensitive policies). As discussed in section 2, we do not attempt
to explain how social preferences are formed and why they change yet it is interesting to underscore the political
economy forces at play and the possible role of international inuence, with some noticeable convergence across
countries on the principle of making work pay(see Banks et al., 2005).
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extent the Netherlands, still exhibit a high taste for redistribution under the extreme assumption
of a zero participation elasticity.
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Figure 4: Revealed Social Inequality Aversion: Sensitivity Checks
Income groups. Secondly, the denition of the I + 1 groups in Saezs model necessarily
bears some arbitrariness in how the population is partitioned. We analyze how results are
a¤ected by alternative denitions of the cut-o¤ points for the income groups. They might be
critical when trying to make group denitions comparable across countries. By construction,
group 0 (workless poor) is identied as the population with zero market income. In our baseline,
the other groups were simply determined by income quintiles among the workers. We suggest
an alternative group denition that places particular focus on the crucial role of group 1 (the
working poor).23 The middle panel of Figure 4 shows that results are mostly insensitive to the
income group denition. We explain this nding as follows: (i) with reasonable denitions of
23Since working poor is a imprecisely-dened concept, we suggest simply taking (1 + x) times the minimum
wage (full-time equivalent income) as the upper bound for the income of that group, rather than xing an arbitrary
poverty line. We are thus able to adopt institutional denitions of working poverty (e.g. individualized earned
income tax credits targeted at the working poor in France and Belgium in the early 2000s relied on such a
denition with x = 30%, which we adopt here). We use o¢ cial or implicit national minimum wages as reported
by the OECD (Immervoll, 2007). Groups 2 to 5 are then dened in proportion to the median income, in order to
consistently account for the income distributions of each country. The upper income bounds for groups 2-4 are 1,
1:5 and 4 times the median income, respectively.
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group 1, we always capture the income gap between groups 0, 1 and 2 to some extent; (ii) the
rest of the social welfare weight distribution is relatively at, so alternative denitions of higher
income groups have little impact.
Finally, we provide a sensitivity analysis with regard to the number of income groups. To
ease comparisons across countries, we have initially opted for a small number of income groups
(I + 1 = 6), checking results obtained with I = 11 groups (10 groups of workers and the
unemployed). The right panel of Figure 4 shows very few changes compared to the baseline.
7 Conclusion
This paper retrieves social inequality aversion parameters consistent with current tax-benet
systems in 18 Western countries under the assumption of optimality, while controlling for di¤er-
ences in labor supply responsiveness. Labor supply elasticities have been estimated on the same
data used for the optimal tax inversion. We nd relatively small di¤erences in labor supply
elasticities across countries, yet resulting redistributive views are signicantly di¤erent between
three groups of nations. Social inequality aversion is highest in Nordic and some Continental
European countries, pointing to Rawlsian preferences, while Southern Europe and the US reect
a very low inequality aversion close to utilitarian views. Furthermore, countries with Rawlsian
preferences only appear so because responses at the extensive margin the dominant margin 
are taken into account. If we impose zero labor supply responses, reecting the possibility that
policymakers ignored e¢ ciency constraints at the time traditional social transfers were put in
place, revealed redistributive tastes become less pronounced and much more similar. This high-
lights the importance of accounting for e¢ ciency constraints when assessing social inequality
aversion.
Future research should extend the scope of the policies under consideration. Indeed, we have
considered a partial optimization problem by looking at direct taxes and transfers. Some other
policies may well have redistributive e¤ects, including non-cash benets and public goods. An-
other limit to our work is the assumption of only one type of behavioral response, namely labor
supply. This appears acceptable as a rst approximation, especially as we focus on workers
(thus excluding capitalists). Despite estimates being di¢ cult to obtain, more general analyses
could explore elasticities of other margins, e.g. migration, tax evasion or long-run behavioral
responses such as educational and career choices. In addition, it might be worthwhile to extent
the political economy perspective by accounting for the political process that generated the
observed tax benet systems in the analysis. For instance, political economy forces could be
modelled as distortions in the optimal tax design before the inversion procedure is applied.
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I Descriptive Statistics
Since the selected population is relatively homogenous, Tables I.1 and I.2 essentially focus on
the characteristics of the discretized income groups, i.e., the main ingredients of the optimal tax
model. This includes income group shares hi, average levels of gross income Yi and disposable
income Ci for each group i = 0; :::5 .We also report e¤ective marginaltax rates T 0i =
Ti Ti 1
Yi Yi 1
and e¤ective participation tax rates Ti T0Yi Y0 .
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Table I.1: Description of the Discretized Population of Childless Singles
Country AT BE BE DK FI FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE
Year 98 98 01 95 98 01 95 01 98 01 95 95 00
Data ECHP PSB PSB ECHP IDS IDS HBS HBS SOEP SOEP HBS LIS LIS
Gross income Yi (note: Y0 = 0)
1 222 203 238 127 190 185 139 189 172 145 113 215 187
2 376 347 392 397 329 356 286 301 373 359 165 371 361
3 452 436 502 545 398 437 360 373 471 490 216 470 454
4 577 532 613 646 481 528 457 467 576 605 263 542 651
5 845 737 856 860 704 769 732 703 814 889 476 724 882
Disposable income Ci
0 61 96 138 140 110 113 110 151 59 80 1 67 65
1 183 181 214 154 178 181 134 171 148 141 101 199 206
2 277 243 284 282 242 273 217 232 245 250 145 287 334
3 321 286 341 367 279 314 267 276 298 320 189 337 433
4 394 333 394 428 326 368 335 338 345 381 219 374 539
5 533 435 510 518 434 491 519 482 475 520 358 478 689
Effective "Marginal" Tax Rate (EMTR)
1 45% 58% 68% 89% 64% 64% 83% 89% 49% 58% 12% 38% 24%
2 39% 57% 54% 53% 54% 46% 43% 45% 51% 49% 15% 44% 27%
3 42% 52% 48% 42% 46% 48% 34% 39% 47% 47% 14% 49% -6%
4 42% 50% 53% 40% 43% 42% 28% 34% 55% 47% 37% 49% 46%
5 48% 50% 52% 58% 51% 49% 33% 39% 45% 51% 35% 43% 35%
Effective Participation Tax Rate (EPTR)
1 45% 58% 68% 89% 64% 64% 83% 89% 49% 58% 12% 38% 24%
2 43% 57% 63% 64% 60% 55% 62% 73% 50% 53% 13% 41% 25%
3 42% 56% 59% 58% 58% 54% 57% 66% 49% 51% 13% 43% 19%
4 42% 55% 58% 55% 55% 52% 51% 60% 50% 50% 17% 43% 27%
5 44% 54% 57% 56% 54% 51% 44% 53% 49% 51% 25% 43% 29%
Group size hi (in %)
0 0.04 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.31 0.30 0.13
1 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.15 0.18
2 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.14 0.20
3 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.14 0.15
4 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.13 0.16 0.19
5 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.16
# observations 206 357 278 518 931 963 1,080 1,013 967 933 164 148 130
This table reports information on income groups for the selected samples. Policy years are 1998, 2001 or 2005. Countries are: AT=Austria, BE=Belgium, DK=Denmark,
FI=Finland, FR=France, GE=Germany, GR=Greece, IE=Ireland. Datasets are: ECHP=European Community Household Panel, PSB=Panel Survey on Belgian
Households, HBS=Household Budget Survey, IDS=Income Distribution Survey, SOEP=German Socio-Economic Panel, LIS=Living in Ireland Survey. Group 0 = non-
participants and Y 0 =0. Other groups: increasing income levels of participants. EMTR are calculated as 1 - {C i - C i-1 }/{Y i  -Y i-1 } and EPTR as 1 - {Ci - C0}/{Y i  -
Y 0 } for all income groups i>0. All incomes in euros per week.
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Table I.2: Description of the Discretized Population of Childless Singles (cont.)
Country IT NL PT SP SP UK UK SW EE HU PL US
Year 95 00 01 96 01 95 01 01 05 05 05 06
Data SHIW SOEP ECHP ECHP ECHP FES FES IDS HBS HBS HBS CPS
Gross income Yi (note: Y0 = 0)
1 188 189 88 134 165 221 229 172 33 41 36 162
2 314 400 150 238 250 361 397 359 56 72 71 362
3 381 505 222 327 335 463 522 439 77 109 102 528
4 484 617 368 458 423 573 661 522 102 151 141 715
5 632 867 639 649 646 818 999 760 152 267 238 1194
Disposable income Ci
0 3 137 25 17 6 133 144 151 13 16 3 17
1 129 186 77 126 151 191 205 179 33 44 17 149
2 209 298 128 204 215 289 316 247 48 64 25 303
3 251 361 182 268 281 362 406 293 65 86 40 426
4 299 443 273 364 339 441 507 345 84 105 59 557
5 375 599 416 496 491 622 751 478 120 162 106 863
Effective "Marginal" Tax Rate (EMTR)
1 33% 74% 41% 19% 13% 74% 73% 84% 38% 33% 60% 18%
2 37% 47% 18% 25% 24% 30% 34% 64% 35% 35% 78% 23%
3 37% 40% 24% 27% 23% 28% 28% 43% 21% 42% 53% 26%
4 53% 27% 38% 27% 34% 28% 28% 36% 23% 55% 50% 30%
5 48% 37% 47% 31% 32% 26% 28% 44% 27% 50% 52% 36%
Effective Participation Tax Rate (EPTR)
1 33% 74% 41% 19% 13% 74% 73% 84% 38% 33% 60% 18%
2 34% 60% 31% 22% 16% 57% 57% 73% 37% 34% 69% 21%
3 35% 55% 29% 23% 18% 50% 50% 68% 32% 36% 64% 23%
4 39% 50% 33% 24% 21% 46% 45% 63% 30% 42% 60% 25%
5 41% 47% 39% 26% 25% 40% 39% 57% 29% 45% 57% 29%
Group size hi (in %)
0 0.16 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.09 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.19 0.06
1 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.19
2 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.20
3 0.16 0.18 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.19
4 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.18
5 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.19
# observations 163 555 106 191 202 561 669 1,768 233 354 1,273 7,053
This table reports information on income groups for the selected sample. Policy years are 1998, 2001 or 2005. Countries are: IT=Italy, NL=the Netherlands,
PT=Portugal, SP=Spain, UK=the United Kingdom, SW=Sweden, EE=Estonia, HU=Hungary, PL=Poland, US=the United States. Datasets are:
ECHP=European Community Household Panel, HBS=Household Budget Survey, IDS=Income Distribution Survey, SOEP=Dutch Socio-Economic Panel,
SHIW=Survey of Households Income and Wealth, FES=Family Expenditure Survey, CPS=Current Population Survey. Notes: Group 0 = non-participants and
Y0=0. Other groups: increasing income levels of participants. EMTR are calculated as 1 - {Ci - Ci-1}/{Yi -Yi-1} and EPTR as 1 - {Ci - C0}/{Yi - Y0} for
all income groups i>0. All incomes in euros per week.
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II Standard and Saez Elasticities
Once the labor supply model is estimated, we numerically simulate elasticities at the individual
level by predicting the labor supply e¤ect of a change in income. For a comparison with the
literature, we rst calculate "standard" wage (resp. non-labor income) elasticities for each
worker, dened as the increase in working time or participation rate when wage rates increase
by 1%. Standard errors are obtained by repeated random draws of the preference parameters
from their estimated distributions and, for each draw, by recalculating elasticities.
In fact, despite the large increase in the number of childless single individuals over the last
few decades, their labor supply behavior has received little attention. Part of it is due to
the fact that recent evidence on labor supply responsiveness stems from natural experiments
based on changes in tax and welfare policies, mainly in the US and the UK, and that these
policies are usually conned to families with children (e.g., Eissa and Liebman, 1996). Mean
wage elasticities together with bootstrapped standard errors are reported in the upper panels of
Tables II.1II.2. They are in line with limited available evidence as surveyed in Bargain et al.
(2012). Elasticities are especially large in Spain, Ireland and Italy, as supported by Callan et al.
(2009) and Aaberge et al. (2002). Other countries show intermediary values, which correspond
to small elasticities around :1 :2, for instance in Germany (see Haan and Steiner, 2000). Hour
elasticities, which incorporate both change in hours for those in work and participation e¤ects,
are close to participation elasticity. This supports that most of the total hour adjustment occurs
at the extensive margin. Income elasticities are found to be very small in all countries, often not
signicantly di¤erent from zero and systematically smaller than :1 in absolute value. Ignoring
income e¤ects in the theoretical model and for the selected population is therefore a reasonable
approximation.
For the particular elasticities used in Saezoptimal tax model, we calibrate uniform changes in
disposable income at the individual levels to obtain percent changes in income gaps as dened
in equations (2) and (3) in the paper. Total responses, measured as a change in the population
shares in each income group, are then obtained by aggregation to calculate the extensive and
intensive margins, i.e., i and i; for income groups i = 1; :::; I (see also Blundell et al., 2009).
These elasticities are reported in the lower part of Tables II.1II.2 and discussed in the main
part of the paper.
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Table II.1: Labor Supply Elasticities
AT BE BE DK FI FI FR FR GE GE GR IE IE
98 98 01 95 98 01 95 01 98 01 95 95 00
Standard elasticities
Wage elasticity - Hours .13 .25 .31 .09 .27 .16 .14 .13 .20 .17 .24 .25 .50
(.05) (.05) (.06) (.04) (.05) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.02) (.05) (.07) (.08)
Wage elasticity - Participation .10 .22 .24 .12 .28 .15 .11 .11 .19 .16 .23 .32 .44
(.04) (.03) (.05) (.03) (.04) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.04) (.06) (.07)
Income elasticity - Hours .00 .00 .00 .00 .10 .01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 -.03 -.02
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Saez (2002)'s elasticities
Intensive margin:
Mean .10 .16 .25 .04 .08 .04 .08 .06 .09 .11 .09 .20 .36
Group 1 .14 .43 .38 .04 .23 .09 .06 .05 .38 .39 .18 .66 .45
(.06) (.11) (.09) (.01) (.04) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.07) (.08) (.09) (.17) (.08)
Group 2 .17 .20 .47 .06 .05 .03 .09 .06 .03 .02 .07 .26 .86
(.06) (.04) (.10) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.02) (.11) (.17)
Group 3 .05 .13 .28 .05 .02 .03 .06 .04 .03 .07 .02 .15 .52
(.02) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.05)
Group 4 .10 .07 .09 .04 .04 .02 .06 .05 .03 .05 .07 .03 .19
(.04) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.05)
Group 5 .04 .10 .22 .04 .05 .03 .12 .12 .03 .04 .08 .03 .33
(.02) (.02) (.11) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.05)
Extensive margin:
Mean .15 .35 .35 .17 .30 .14 .09 .09 .20 .22 .34 .57 .38
Group 1 .14 .43 .38 .04 .23 .09 .06 .05 .38 .39 .18 .66 .45
(.04) (.07) (.05) (.01) (.03) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.04) (.05) (.05) (.08) (.08)
Group 2 .16 .53 .46 .16 .32 .11 .12 .07 .17 .21 .53 .78 .56
(.05) (.08) (.07) (.03) (.05) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.10) (.10) (.10)
Group 3 .19 .25 .24 .24 .35 .13 .10 .09 .25 .25 .40 .51 .49
(.05) (.04) (.03) (.06) (.05) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.07) (.08) (.08)
Group 4 .14 .38 .42 .18 .22 .20 .11 .09 .11 .15 .34 .60 .27
(.04) (.04) (.07) (.04) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.06) (.05) (.05)
Group 5 .11 .15 .23 .23 .36 .19 .07 .14 .10 .08 .27 .30 .12
(.02) (.02) (.07) (.05) (.05) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.05) (.11) (.11)
Note: standard elasticities are computed numerically by simulation of responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates or unearned income. Saez elasticities are obtained by simulated increases
corresponding to 1% of the difference in mean disposable incomes between a given income group and the closest lower group (mobility) or the group of nonworkers (participation). Bootstrapped
standard errors in brackets.
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Table II.2: Labor Supply Elasticities (cont.)
IT NL PT SP SP UK UK SW EE HU PL US Mean
95 00 01 96 01 95 01 01 05 05 05 06
Standard elasticities
Wage elasticity - Hours .47 .11 .04 .27 .39 .41 .21 .17 .15 .14 .08 .20 .22
(.10) (.02) (.04) (.07) (.04) (.05) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.04)
Wage elasticity - Participation .42 .09 .04 .27 .32 .33 .20 .14 .14 .13 .07 .17 .20
(.09) (.01) (.03) (.06) (.04) (.04) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.03)
Income elasticity - Hours .03 .00 .00 -.01 -.01 .00 .00 .01 .00 .06 .00 .00 .01
(.02) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.01) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Saez (2002)'s elasticities
Intensive margin:
Mean .28 .12 .08 .12 .44 .06 .07 .06 .07 .07 .04 .18 .13
Group 1 .70 .16 .11 .25 .87 .10 .13 .11 .10 .11 .09 .33 .26
(.14) (.04) (.26) (.10) (.12) (.02) (.02) (.03) (.03) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.07)
Group 2 .47 .19 .07 .11 .50 .07 .05 .12 .02 .06 .03 .09 .17
(.10) (.04) (.15) (.04) (.06) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.04)
Group 3 .14 .04 .05 .03 .37 .01 .01 .04 .05 .09 .03 .13 .06
(.03) (.01) (.06) (.01) (.04) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Group 4 .08 .05 .07 .08 .11 .03 .04 .02 .07 .05 .03 .12 .05
(.02) (.01) (.05) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Group 5 .03 .15 .09 .12 .33 .06 .11 .04 .10 .04 .05 .20 .10
(.01) (.16) (.04) (.04) (.12) (.01) (.07) (.03) (.05) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Extensive margin:
Mean .59 .11 .06 .32 .43 .21 .18 .17 .12 .06 .09 .28 .24
Group 1 .70 .16 .11 .25 .87 .10 .13 .11 .10 .11 .09 .33 .26
(.11) (.02) (.03) (.07) (.12) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.04)
Group 2 .67 .13 .13 .50 .62 .21 .20 .21 .08 .03 .09 .34 .30
(.11) (.02) (.04) (.13) (.07) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.05)
Group 3 .50 .14 .07 .25 .36 .17 .21 .14 .11 .08 .07 .33 .24
(.09) (.01) (.02) (.06) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.04)
Group 4 .64 .09 .01 .32 .17 .23 .19 .21 .14 .03 .10 .25 .22
(.11) (.01) (.02) (.05) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.01) (.02) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.03)
Group 5 .46 .04 .01 .26 .12 .34 .18 .17 .17 .05 .09 .13 .17
(.09) (.01) (.02) (.04) (.02) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.01) (.01) (.00) (.04)
Note: standard elasticities are computed numerically by simulation of responses to a 1% uniform increase in wage rates or unearned income. Saez elasticities are obtained by simulated increases
corresponding to 1% of the difference in mean disposable incomes between a given income group and the closest lower group (mobility) or the group of nonworkers (participation). Bootstrapped
standard errors in brackets.
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